International Law in Cyberspace by Hongju Koh, Harold





LAW  JOURNAL 
  
FEATURE: Online 
DECEMBER 2012 Volume 54 
International Law in Cyberspace 
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Harold Hongju Koh to the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. Meade, MD, Sept. 18, 
2012 
 
Harold Hongju Koh* 
Thank you, Colonel Brown, for your kind invitation to speak here today at this very 
important conference on “the roles of cyber in national defense.” I have been an 
international lawyer for more than thirty years, a government lawyer practicing 
international law for more than a decade, and the State Department’s Legal Adviser 
for nearly 3½ years. While my daily workload covers many of the bread and butter 
issues of international law—diplomatic immunity, the law of the sea, international 
humanitarian law, treaty interpretation—like many of you, I find more and more of 
my time is spent grappling with the question of how international law applies in 
cyberspace.  
                                                 
 
* Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State; Martin R. Flug ’55 Professor of International 
Law (on leave), Yale Law School. This is a footnoted version of a speech delivered on 
September 18, 2012, at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference on the Roles of 
Cyber in National Defense, at Fort Meade, Maryland. 
2 Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 54 
 
 
Everyone here knows that cyberspace presents new opportunities and new challenges 
for the United States in every foreign policy realm, including national defense. But for 
international lawyers, it also presents cutting-edge issues of international law, which 
go to a very fundamental question: how do we apply old laws of war to new cyber-circumstances, 
staying faithful to enduring principles, while accounting for changing times and technologies? 
Many, many international lawyers here in the U.S. Government and around the world 
have struggled with this question, so today I’d like to present an overview of how we 
in the U.S. Government have gone about meeting this challenge. At the outset, let me 
highlight that the entire endeavor of applying established international law to 
cyberspace is part of a broader international conversation. We are not alone in 
thinking about these questions; we are actively engaged with the rest of the 
international community, both bilaterally and multilaterally, on the subject of applying 
international law in cyberspace.  
With your permission, I’d like to offer a series of questions and answers that 
illuminate where we are right now—in a place where we’ve made remarkable headway 
in a relatively short period of time, but are still finding new questions for each and 
every one we answer. In fact, the U.S. Government has been regularly sharing these 
thoughts with our international partners. Most of the points that follow we have not 
just agreed upon internally, but made diplomatically, in our submissions to the U.N. 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that deals with information technology 
issues.1 
 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE: WHAT WE KNOW 
So let me start with the most fundamental questions: 
Question 1: Do established principles of international law apply in cyberspace?  
                                                 
 
1 The U.N. Group of Governmental Experts has begun work pursuant to G.A. Res. 66/24, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/24 (Dec. 13, 2011); the U.S. expert is one of 15 members of that 
group. The previous Group of Experts met in 2009–10 pursuant to G.A. Res. 60/45, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/45 (Jan. 6, 2006), and submitted a report to the U.N. Secretary-General. 
U.N. Group of Governmental Experts, Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of Information Security, presented to the 63rd Sess. of the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/65/201 (July 30, 2010). A recent U.S. submission on this topic can be 
found in U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in 
the Context of Information Security, Rep. of the Secretary-General, 14–21, U.N. Doc A/66/152 (July 
15, 2011).  




Answer 1: Yes, international law principles do apply in cyberspace. Everyone 
here knows how cyberspace opens up a host of novel and extremely difficult legal 
issues. But on this key question, this answer has been apparent, at least as far as the 
U.S. Government has been concerned. Significantly, this view has not necessarily 
been universal in the international community. At least one country has questioned 
whether existing bodies of international law apply to the cutting edge issues presented 
by the internet. Some have also said that existing international law is not up to the 
task, and that we need entirely new treaties to impose a unique set of rules on 
cyberspace. But the United States has made clear our view that established principles 
of international law do apply in cyberspace.  
Question 2: Is cyberspace a law-free zone, where anything goes?  
Answer 2: Emphatically no. Cyberspace is not a “law-free” zone where anyone 
can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint. 
Think of it this way. This is not the first time that technology has changed and that 
international law has been asked to deal with those changes. In particular, because the 
tools of conflict are constantly evolving, one relevant body of law—international 
humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict—affirmatively anticipates 
technological innovation, and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to such 
innovation. To be sure, new technologies raise new issues and thus new questions. 
Many of us in this room have struggled with such questions, and we will continue to 
do so over many years. But to those who say that established law is not up to the task, 
we must articulate and build consensus around how it applies and reassess from there 
whether and what additional understandings are needed.2 Developing common 
understandings about how these rules apply in the context of cyber activities in armed 
conflict will promote stability in this area.  
That consensus-building work brings me to some questions and answers we have 
offered to our international partners to explain how both the law of going to war (jus ad 
bellum) and the laws that apply in conducting war (jus in bello) apply to cyber action.  
Question 3: Do cyber activities ever constitute a use of force? 
Answer 3: Yes. Cyber activities may in certain circumstances constitute uses of 
force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter3 and customary 
international law. In analyzing whether a cyber operation would constitute a use of 
                                                 
 
2 See, e.g., United States, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a 
Networked World (May 2011), at 9, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (“U.S. 
International Strategy for Cyberspace”). 
3 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
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force, most commentators focus on whether the direct physical injury and property 
damage resulting from the cyber event looks like that which would be considered a 
use of force if produced by kinetic weapons.4 For example, cyber activities that proximately 
result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force. In 
assessing whether an event constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we 
must evaluate factors including the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the 
action (recognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and 
location, effects and intent, among other possible issues. Commonly cited examples 
of cyber activity that would constitute a use of force include, for example, (1) 
operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown, (2) operations that open a dam 
above a populated area causing destruction, or (3) operations that disable air traffic 
control resulting in airplane crashes. Only a moment’s reflection makes you realize 
that this is common sense: if the physical consequences of a cyber attack work the 
kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber 
attack should equally be considered a use of force. 
Question 4: May a state ever respond to a computer network attack by exercising a right of 
national self-defense? 
Answer 4: Yes. A state’s national right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 
of the UN Charter, may be triggered by computer network activities that 
amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof. As the United States 
affirmed in its 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, “[w]hen warranted, the 
United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other 
threat to our country.”5 
Question 5: Do jus in bello rules apply to computer network attacks? 
Answer 5: Yes. In the context of an armed conflict, the law of armed conflict 
applies to regulate the use of cyber tools in hostilities, just as it does other 
tools. The principles of necessity and proportionality limit uses of force in self-
defense, and would regulate what may constitute a lawful response under the 
circumstances. There is no legal requirement that the response to a cyber armed 
attack take the form of a cyber action, as long as the response meets the requirements 
of necessity and proportionality.6 
                                                 
 
4 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 
913 (1999). 
5 See U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 14. 
6 Building on Answer 4, these jus ad bellum concepts would inform the permissible scope of a 
use of force taken in self-defense. If such a use of force were taken in the context of an armed 
conflict, the rules of jus in bello would apply, as discussed further below. 




Question 6: Must attacks distinguish between military and nonmilitary objectives? 
Answer 6: Yes. The jus in bello principle of distinction applies to computer 
network attacks undertaken in the context of an armed conflict. The principle of 
distinction applies to cyber activities that amount to an “attack”—as that term is 
understood in the law of war—in the context of an armed conflict. As in any form of 
armed conflict, the principle of distinction requires that the intended effect of the 
attack must be to harm a legitimate military target.7 We must distinguish military 
objectives—that is, objects that make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose destruction would offer a military advantage—from civilian objects, which 
under international law are generally protected from attack. 
Question 7: Must attacks adhere to the principle of proportionality? 
Answer 7: Yes. The jus in bello principle of proportionality applies to computer 
network attacks undertaken in the context of an armed conflict. The principle of 
proportionality prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss to 
civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.8 Parties to an armed 
conflict must assess what the expected harm to civilians is likely to be, and weigh the 
risk of such collateral damage against the importance of the expected military 
advantage to be gained. In the cyber context, this rule requires parties to a conflict to 
assess (1) the effects of cyber weapons on both military and civilian infrastructure and 
users, including shared physical infrastructure (such as a dam or a power grid) that 
would affect civilians; (2) the potential physical damage that a cyber attack may cause, 
such as death or injury that may result from effects on critical infrastructure; and (3) 
the potential effects of a cyber attack on civilian objects that are not military 
objectives, such as private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but 
may be networked to computers that are military objectives.  
                                                 
 
7 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (“Additional Protocol I”), art. 52(2), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. The United States, while not a State Party to Additional 
Protocol I and continuing to have serious concerns with respect to a number of its provisions, 
considers some of its provisions to reflect customary international law and also supports a 
number of its provisions that do not reflect customary law. For discussion of the U.S. 
concerns with Additional Protocol I, see Abraham D. Sofaer, The Position of the United States on 
Current Law of War Agreements, in The Sixth Annual American Red-Cross-Washington College of Law 
Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 415, 460–71 
(1987). For discussion of the provisions of Additional Protocol I that the United States 
supports, see Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary 
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L 
& POL’Y 415, 419–36 (1987). 
8 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 51(5). 
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Question 8: How should states assess their cyber weapons? 
Answer 8: States should undertake a legal review of weapons, including those 
that employ a cyber capability.9 Such a review should entail an analysis, for 
example, of whether a particular capability would be inherently indiscriminate, i.e., that it 
could not be used consistent with the principles of distinction and proportionality. 
The U.S. Government undertakes at least two stages of legal review of the use of 
weapons in the context of armed conflict: first, an evaluation of new weapons to 
determine whether their use would be per se prohibited by the law of war; and second, 
specific operations employing weapons are always reviewed to ensure that each 
particular operation is also compliant with the law of war.  
Question 9: In this analysis, what role does state sovereignty play? 
Answer 9: States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the 
sovereignty of other states, including outside the context of armed conflict. The 
physical infrastructure that supports the Internet and cyber activities is generally 
located in sovereign territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state. 
Because of the interconnected, interoperable nature of cyberspace, operations 
targeting networked information infrastructures in one country may create effects in 
another country. Whenever a state contemplates conducting activities in cyberspace, 
the sovereignty of other states needs to be considered. 
Question 10: Are states responsible when cyber acts are undertaken through proxies? 
Answer 10: Yes. States are legally responsible for activities undertaken through 
“proxy actors,” who act on the state’s instructions or under its direction or 
control. The ability to mask one’s identity and geography in cyberspace and the 
resulting difficulties of timely, high-confidence attribution can create significant 
challenges for states in identifying, evaluating, and accurately responding to threats. 
But putting attribution problems aside for a moment, established international law 
does address the question of proxy actors. States are legally responsible for activities 
undertaken through putatively private actors, who act on the state’s instructions or 
under its direction or control.10 If a state exercises a sufficient degree of control over 
an ostensibly private person or group of persons committing an internationally 
wrongful act, the state assumes responsibility for the act, just as if official agents of 
                                                 
 
9 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 36. 
10 These rules have been endorsed by most states and the International Court of Justice and 
are generally reflected in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See, e.g., Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, Annex to G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/56/83; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits), 2007 
I.C.J. 43, 207–08 (Feb. 26, 2007).  




the state itself had committed it. These rules are designed to ensure that states cannot 
hide behind putatively private actors to engage in conduct that is internationally 
wrongful.  
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE: CHALLENGES AND UNCERTAINTIES 
These ten answers should give you a sense of how far we have come in doing what 
any good international lawyer does: applying established law to new facts, and 
explaining our positions to other interested lawyers.  At the same time, there are 
obviously many more issues where the questions remain under discussion. Let me 
identify three particularly difficult questions that I don’t intend to answer here today.  
Instead, my hope is to shed some light on some of the cutting-edge legal issues that 
we’ll all be facing together over the next few years: 
Unresolved Question 1: How can a use of force regime take into account all of 
the novel kinds of effects that states can produce through the click of a button?   
As I said above, the United States has affirmed that established jus ad bellum rules do 
apply to uses of force in cyberspace. I have also noted some clear-cut cases where the 
physical effects of a hostile cyber action would be comparable to what a kinetic action 
could achieve: for example, a bomb might break a dam and flood a civilian 
population, but insertion of a line of malicious code from a distant computer might 
just as easily achieve that same result. As you all know, however, there are other types 
of cyber actions that do not have a clear kinetic parallel, which raise profound 
questions about exactly what we mean by “force.” At the same time, the difficulty of 
reaching a definitive legal conclusion or consensus among states on when and under 
what circumstances a hostile cyber action would constitute an armed attack does not 
automatically suggest that we need an entirely new legal framework specific to 
cyberspace. Outside of the cyber-context, such ambiguities and differences of view 
have long existed among states.   
To cite just one example of this, the United States has for a long time taken the 
position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use 
of force. In our view, there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an 
“armed attack” that may warrant a forcible response.11 But that is not to say that any 
illegal use of force triggers the right to use any and all force in response—such 
responses must still be necessary and of course proportionate. We recognize, on the other 
hand, that some other countries and commentators have drawn a distinction between 
the “use of force” and an “armed attack,” and view “armed attack”—triggering the 
                                                 
 
11 See, e.g., William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 
295, 299–302 (2004) and Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in 
International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93–96 (1989). 
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right to self-defense—as a subset of uses of force, which passes a higher threshold of 
gravity.12 My point here is not to rehash old debates, but to illustrate that states have 
long had to sort through complicated jus ad bellum questions. In this respect, the 
existence of complicated cyber questions relating to jus ad bellum is not in itself a new 
development; it is just applying old questions to the latest developments in 
technology.  
Unresolved Question 2: What do we do about “dual-use infrastructure” in 
cyberspace?  
As you all know, information and communications infrastructure is often shared 
between state militaries and private, civilian communities. The law of war requires that 
civilian infrastructure not be used to seek to immunize military objectives from attack, 
including in the cyber realm. But how, exactly, are the jus in bello rules to be 
implemented in cyberspace? Parties to an armed conflict will need to assess the 
potential effects of a cyber attack on computers that are not military objectives, such 
as private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but may be networked 
to computers that are valid military objectives. Parties will also need to consider the 
harm to the civilian uses of such infrastructure in performing the necessary 
proportionality review. Any number of factual scenarios could arise, however, which 
will require a careful, fact-intensive legal analysis in each situation. 
Unresolved Question 3: How do we address the problem of attribution in 
cyberspace?  
As I mentioned earlier, cyberspace significantly increases an actor’s ability to engage in 
attacks with “plausible deniability,” by acting through proxies. I noted that legal tools 
exist to ensure that states are held accountable for those acts. What I want to highlight 
here is that many of these challenges—in particular, those concerning attribution—
are as much questions of a technical and policy nature rather than exclusively or even 
predominantly questions of law. Cyberspace remains a new and dynamic operating 
environment, and we cannot expect that all answers to the new and confounding 
questions we face will be legal ones.  
These questions about effects, dual use, and attribution are difficult legal and policy 
questions that existed long before the development of cyber tools, and that will 
continue to be a topic of discussion among our allies and partners as cyber tools 
                                                 
 
12 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 
(Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 178 (June 27) (“it will be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms 
of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms”) and id. at 
127 (“[w]hile an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self-defense, a use 
of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot . . . produce any entitlement to take collective 
countermeasures involving the use of force”).  




develop. Of course, there remain many other difficult and important questions about 
the application of international law to activities in cyberspace—for example, about the 
implications of sovereignty and neutrality law, enforcement mechanisms, and the 
obligations of states concerning “hacktivists” operating from within their territory. 
While these are not questions that I can address in this brief speech, they are critically 
important questions on which international lawyers will focus intensely in the years to 
come.  
And just as cyberspace presents challenging new issues for lawyers, it presents 
challenging new technical and policy issues. Not all of the issues I’ve mentioned are 
susceptible to clear legal answers derived from existing precedents—in many cases, 
quite the contrary. Answering these tough questions within the framework of existing 
law, consistent with our values and accounting for the legitimate needs of national 
security, will require a constant dialogue between lawyers, operators, and 
policymakers. All that we as lawyers can do is to apply in the cyber context the same 
rigorous approach to these hard questions that arise in the future, as we apply every 
day to what might be considered more traditional forms of conflict. 
III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A “SMART POWER” APPROACH TO 
CYBERSPACE 
This, in a nutshell, is where we are with regard to cyber-conflict: We have begun work 
to build consensus on a number of answers, but questions continue to arise that must 
be answered in the months and years ahead. Beyond these questions and answers and 
unresolved questions, though, lies a much bigger picture, one that we are very focused 
on at the State Department. Which brings me to my final two questions: 
Final Question 1: Is international humanitarian law the only body of international law that 
applies in cyberspace? 
Final Answer 1: No. As important as international humanitarian law is, it is not 
the only international law that applies in cyberspace. 
 Obviously, cyberspace has become pervasive in our lives, not just in the national 
defense arena, but also through social media, publishing and broadcasting, 
expressions of human rights, and expansion of international commerce, both through 
online markets and online commercial techniques. Many other bodies of international 
and national law address those activities, and how those different bodies of law 
overlap and interact with the laws of cyber conflict is something we will all have to 
work out over time.  
Take human rights. At the same time that cyber activity can pose a threat, we all 
understand that cyber-communication is increasingly becoming a dominant mode of 
expression in the 21st century. More and more people express their views not by 
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speaking on a soap box at Speakers’ Corner, but by blogging, tweeting, commenting, 
or posting videos and commentaries. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)—adopted more than 70 years ago—was remarkably forward-looking 
in anticipating these trends. It says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”13 In short, all human beings are entitled to certain rights, whether they 
choose to exercise them in a city square or an Internet chat room. This principle is an 
important part of our global diplomacy, and is encapsulated in the Internet Freedom 
agenda about which my boss, Secretary Clinton, has spoken so passionately.14 
You all know of this Administration’s efforts not just in the areas of cyberconflict, but 
also in many other cyber areas: cybersecurity, cyber-commerce, fighting child 
pornography and other forms of cybercrime, stopping intellectual property piracy, as 
well as promoting free expression and human rights.15 So the cyberconflict issues with 
which this group grapples do not constitute the whole of our approach to cyberspace; 
they are an important part—but only a part—of this Administration’s broader “smart 
power” approach to cyberspace.  
What I have outlined today are a series of answers to cyberspace questions that the 
United States is on the record as supporting. I have also suggested a few of the 
challenging questions that remain before us, and developments over the next decade 
will surely produce new questions. But you should not think of these questions and 
answers as just a box to check before deciding whether a particular proposed 
operation is lawful or not. Rather, these questions and answers are part of a much 
broader foreign policy agenda, which transpires in a broader framework of respect for 
international law.  
That leads to my Final Question for this group: Why should U.S Government lawyers care 
about international law in cyberspace at all? 
The Answer: Because compliance with international law frees us to do more, and do 
more legitimately, in cyberspace, in a way that more fully promotes our national 
interests. Compliance with international law in cyberspace is part and parcel of our 
broader “smart power” approach to international law as part of U.S. foreign policy.  
It is worth noting two fundamentally different philosophies about international law. 
One way to think about law, whether domestic or international, is as a straitjacket, a 
                                                 
 
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 19 (emphasis added). 
14 See, e.g., Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 
15 See U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 2. 




pure constraint. This approach posits that nations have serious, legitimate interests, 
and legal regimes restrict their ability to carry them out. One consequence of this view 
is that, since law is just something that constrains, it should be resisted whenever 
possible. Resisting so-called “extensions” of the law to new areas often seems 
attractive—because, after all, the old laws weren’t built for these new challenges 
anyway, some say, so we should tackle those challenges without the legal straitjacket, 
while leaving the old laws behind. 
But that is not the United States Government’s view of the law, domestic or 
international. We see law not as a straitjacket, but as one great university calls it when 
it confers its diplomas, a body of “wise restraints that make us free.” International law 
is not purely constraint, it frees us and empowers us to do things we could never do 
without law’s legitimacy. If we succeed in promoting a culture of compliance, we will 
reap the benefits. And if we earn a reputation for compliance, the actions we do take 
will earn enhanced legitimacy worldwide for their adherence to the rule of law. 
These are not new themes, but I raise them here because they resonate squarely with 
the strategy we have been pursuing in cyberspace over the past few years. Of course, 
the United States has impressive cyber-capabilities; it should be clear from the bulk of 
my discussion that adherence to established principles of law does not prevent us 
from using those capabilities to achieve important ends. But we also know that we 
will be safer, the more that we can rally other states to the view that these established 
principles do impose meaningful constraints, and that there is already an existing set of 
laws that protect our security in cyberspace. And the more widespread the 
understanding that cyberspace follows established rules—and that we live by them—
the stronger we can be in pushing back against those who would seek to introduce 
brand new rules that may be contrary to our interests. 
That is why, in our diplomacy, we do not whisper about these issues. We talk openly 
and bilaterally with other countries about the application of established international 
law to cyberspace. We talk about these issues multilaterally, at the U.N. Group of 
Governmental Experts and at other fora, in promoting this vision of compliance with 
international law in cyberspace. We talk about them regionally, as when we recently co-
sponsored an ASEAN Regional Forum event to focus the international community’s 
attention on the problem of proxy actors engaging in unlawful conduct in 
cyberspace.16 Preventing proxy attacks on us is an important interest, and as part of 
                                                 
 
16 See, e.g., ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary Report, ARF Workshop on Proxy 
Actors in Cyberspace, Hoi An City, Quang Nam Province, Viet Nam (March 14–15, 2012), 
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our discussions we have outlined the ways that existing international law addresses 
this problem. 
The diplomacy I have described is not limited to the legal issues this group of lawyers 
is used to facing in the operational context. These issues are interconnected with 
countless other cyber issues that we face daily in our foreign policy, such as 
cybersecurity, cyber-commerce, human rights in cyberspace, and public diplomacy 
through cyber tools. In all of these areas, let me repeat again, compliance with international 
law in cyberspace is part and parcel of our broader smart power approach to international law as part 
of U.S. foreign policy. Compliance with international law—and thinking actively together 
about how best to promote that compliance—can only free us to do more, and to do 
more legitimately, in the emerging frontiers of cyberspace, in a way that more fully 
promotes our U.S. national interests.  
Thank you very much. 
 
